Environmental Policy for Non-point Source Pollutions in a Bertrand Duopoly

公開日:2017.11.30

発行日
2017年10月
概要
 This study investigates the effectiveness of ambient charges under non-point source (NPS) pollutions in a imperfect competition framework. To this end, following Ganguli and Raju(2012), it constructs a one-stage game and a two-stage game in which Bertrand duopolistic fi…rms choose their best prices and abatement technology, respectively. It is demonstrated in both games that an increase in the ambient charge can lead to a decrease in pollution. This finding indicates that the ambient charge can efficiently control pollution in a Bertrand duopoly.
キーワード

Non-point source pollution

Ambient technology

Ambient charge

Bertrand competition

Two stage game

文献等

掲載誌名・書名:

IERCU Discussion Paper, No.287

公開者・出版社:

経済研究所

種類
紀要
言語
英語
権利情報
この資料の著作権は、資料の著作者または学校法人中央大学に帰属します。著作権法が定める私的利用・引用を超える使用を希望される場合には、掲載誌発行部局へお問い合わせください。

このページのTOPへ