兼任取締役制度と戦略的意義――競争的関係の交錯的変容に関連して――

Interlocking Directorates and Its Strategic Meaning: In Relation to the Complicated Transfiguration of Competitive State

公開日:2017.10.18

発行日
2017年08月31日
概要
 The Clayton Act of 1914 prohibited interlocking directorates among competing corporation. But it didn’t condemn the practice in general. In fact after the Clayton Act 1914 the frequency of interlocking directorates suddenly increased.
 In the same period it was attacked by the reason that it was the root of many evils.
 However nowadays interlocking directorates has been receiving in the almost corporations and industries. Furthermore it has been receiving public attention that it is most flexible coordination or control.
 In this paper I try to seek the cause of interlocking directorates and its strategic meaning. My concern in this study is relevant to interdependence between interlocking directorates and 3 types of competition. Steuer argued that the importance of the vertical competition has influence on horizontal competition and interlocking directorates. I think also without consideration for vertical competition a firm’s market power can’t be exactly grasped . I admit for this reason his idea that vertical competition has great roll at horizontal competition.
 However I think follows that vertical competition does not mean competition theory but bargaining theory. Finally I concluded that interlocking directorates was caused by multidimensional factors and the change of its strategic meanings has relation to drastic environmental change. This suggest Ashby’s theorem “ law of requisite variety ”.
キーワード

兼任取締役

多次元・制約的モデル

クレイトン法

組織間調整・組織間コントロール手段

戦略的依存関係

水平的競争

垂直的競争

業界

需要の交差弾力性

文献等

掲載誌名・書名:

企業研究, 第31号, pp.63-84

公開者・出版社:

企業研究所

書誌コード類:

ISSN: 1347-9938

種類
紀要
言語
日本語
権利情報
この資料の著作権は、資料の著作者または学校法人中央大学に帰属します。著作権法が定める私的利用・引用を超える使用を希望される場合には、掲載誌発行部局へお問い合わせください。

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